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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Tiffany Leigh Turbyfill appeals from her conviction for felony DUI. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Deputy Tim Reynolds stopped Turbyfill's car because of a broken taillight. 
(Trial Tr., p. 6, Ls. 1-4; p. 6, L. 22 - p. 7, L. 4.) Turbyfill smelled of alcohol and 
admitted having been drinking. (Trial Tr., p. 7, L. 12 - p. S, L. 2.) Using an Alco-
Sensor III Deputy Reynolds had Turbyfill provide three breath samples, which 
tested .054, .10S, and .110 percent, respectively. (Trial Tr., p. 9, L. 10 - p. 13, L. 
1S.) When she provided the first sample Turbyfill did not seal her lips around the 
breath tube and much of the air did not go into the machine. (Trial Tr., p. 16, L. 
23 - p. 17, L. 20.) Deputy Reynolds believed the first sample was inadequate for 
proper testing. (Trial Tr., p. 23, Ls. 5-21.) 
The state charged Turbyfill with felony DUI. (R., pp. 65-66.) Turbyfill 
moved to dismiss the charge based on the claim that the state was barred by a 
valid BAC test of less than .OS. (R., p. 91.) After hearing evidence challenging 
the validity of the .054 BAC result the district court denied the motion to dismiss. 
(10/21/10 Tr., p. 30, L. 9 - p. 32, L. 2.) 
The jury returned a guilty verdict. (R., p. 149.) The district court entered 
judgment. (R., pp. 160-65.) Turbyfill filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. pp. 173-
75.) 
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ISSUE 
Turbyfill states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Turbyfill's motion 
to dismiss because one of her breath tests resulted in an alcohol 
concentration of .054, below the legal limit of .08? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Turbyfill failed to demonstrate that that the district court erred by 
denying her motion to dismiss the felony DUI charge against her because the 
first breath test, measuring .054, was not a valid measure of alcohol 
concentration? 
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ARGUMENT 
Because The Initial Breath Test Was Not A Valid Measure Of Alcohol 
Concentration, The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Turbyfill's Motion To 
Dismiss 
A. Introduction 
The evidence presented to both the trial judge and the jury showed that 
the .054 BAC test, taken in conjunction with two other tests that showed .108 and 
.110 respectively, was not a valid measure of Turbyfill's actual level of 
intoxication as a matter of fact. Turbyfill does not contest the factual invalidity of 
the .054 test, but contends that the test was valid as a matter of law, and 
therefore her prosecution was statutorily barred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) 
Review of applicable law and precedent shows that the question of the validity of 
the testing of the first breath sample was a question of fact and therefore Turbyfill 
has failed to show that she was entitled to the statutory bar on prosecution for 
DUI of persons whom testing shows have a BAC of less than the legal limit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The interpretation and construction of statutes present questions of law 
over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Anderson, 145 
Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 788, 792 (2008); State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. The Evidence Established That The .054 Sample Was Invalidly Low 
Idaho's DUI statute "provides for one crime with two alternative methods 
of proof-driving while under the influence of alcohol or driving with an alcohol 
3 
level of .08 or more." State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 484, 988 P.2d 700, 710 
(Ct. App. 1999). These alternate methods of proof are referred to in the case law 
as the "impairment theory" and the "per se theory." 19.:. Idaho DUI law prohibits, 
with limited exceptions not applicable to this case, prosecution for DUI if the 
driver has "an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08 ... as shown by analysis of 
his ... breath, by a test requested by a police officer." I.C. § 18-8004(2). Thus, a 
driver who is demonstrated to not be DUI under the per se theory may not be 
prosecuted under the impairment theory. 
In this case the state proceeded exclusively on the per se theory. (R., p. 
65.) The only evidence the state presented regarding intoxication was the breath 
testing. (See generally Trial Tr.) The jury was instructed only on the per se 
theory. (11/8/10 Tr., p. 95, Ls. 15-18.) The jury therefore necessarily found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Turbyfill drove with a BAC of more than .08 as 
proved by breath testing. (R., p. 149.) Failure of the single .054 test result 
therefore did not create even a reasonable doubt that Turbyfill had "an alcohol 
concentration of less than 0.08 ... as shown by analysis of [her] ... breath, by a 
test requested by a police officer." I.C. § 18-8004(2). Therefore, her prosecution 
was not barred. 
Turbyfill, however, claims that it must be accepted as a matter of law that 
she had an "an alcohol concentration of less than 0.08 .,. as shown by analysis 
of [her] ... breath, by a test requested by a police officer" because of the single 
.054 breath test result. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6-11.) Her claim does not 
withstand analysis. 
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In State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,429, 913 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Ct. App. 
1996), the Idaho Court of Appeals interpreted the prosecution bar in I.C. § 18-
8004(2), applied the rule of lenity, and concluded that the results of a single 
breath sample constitute "a test." Thus, the state is not permitted to "disregard 
one valid sample that shows an alcohol concentration" of less than the per se 
amount. lit (emphasis added). The court then held that "because one of Mills's 
breath samples fell below [the per se limit], and the state made no showing that 
the sample was an invalid aberration, Mills cannot be prosecuted for DUI." lit 
In this case, however, the state did make a showing that the .054 sample 
was an invalid aberration. The state presented evidence that Turbyfill's first 
sample was flawed in the manner in which it was collected because Turbyfill did 
not create a proper seal around the collection tube as she blew. (Trial Tr., p. 16, 
L. 23 - p. 17, L. 20; p. 23, Ls. 5-21.) If the difference between the first and 
second samples are not within .02 of each other it means that one of those 
samples is providing a false reading, either high or low. (Trial Tr., p. 37, Ls. 8-
14.) One reason for such disparity may be the adequacy of the breath sample 
provided and whether it came from a shallow lung sample or a deep lung sample. 
(Tr., p. 47, L. 10 - p. 49, L. 8.) Failure to create a tight seal in providing the 
sample would allow the machine to take in ambient air and might result in a false 
low reading. (Trial Tr., p. 59, L. 20 - p. 60, L. 16.) 
If the samples are not within .02 of each other a third sample must then be 
taken to demonstrate which of the first two is the accurate reading and which is 
the false reading. (Tr., p. 37, Ls. 14-18.) In this case the initial two readings of 
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.054 and .108 are so disparate that one of them had to be either a false high 
reading or a false low reading. (Tr., p. 42, Ls. 2-23.) If the third sample is within 
.02 of one of the first two samples then the disparate sample can be deemed 
invalid. (Trial Tr., p. 61, Ls. 12-19.) This evidence established that the .054 
sample was an invalid aberration that produced a false low measurement. 
Citing State v. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 (Ct. App. 1999), 
Turbyfill argues that the .054 sample was not an invalid aberration because it 
was admissible as evidence of her actual alcohol concentration. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 8-11.) Turbyfill's argument is without merit. 
Mazzuca provided two breath samples (he refused to provide a third), 
which measured .14 and .11 BAC, respectively, and both were flagged by the 
breath testing machine as "deficient." Mazzuca, 132 Idaho at 868-69, 979 P.2d 
at 1226-27. After the district court denied Mazzuca's motion in limine to exclude 
the evidence of his breath tests he entered a conditional guilty plea preserving 
that issue for appeal. kL at 869, 979 P.2d at 1227. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed, in part on the basis of evidence that "there was no possibility that the 
samples could have been less than .14 and .11" and that the tests would have 
accurately measured the samples provided but that samples would not have 
contained the "deep lung air" that would show a more accurate, even larger, 
alcohol concentration. kL at 870, 979 P.2d at 1228. Thus, the evidence was 
properly admissible to prove that "Mazzuca had an alcohol content above the 
legal limit for driving." kL 
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Turbyfill's reliance on Mazzuca is misplaced. In both cases the defendant 
gave deficient samples in which the BAC could not have been less than the 
measured amount. Turbyfill, however, is essentially arguing that her BAC could 
not have been more than .054. Because Turbyfill is trying to prove the opposite 
of what the state was trying to prove in Mazucca, her argument that the .054 test 
established a BAC of less than .08 as a matter of law is without merit. The 
evidence showed that the .054 was invalidly low. Therefore, the invalidly low 
.054 test did not establish that Turbyfill had an "alcohol concentration of less than 
0.08" in the face of two additional, and accurate, tests showing a BAC of greater 
than .08. I.C. § 18-8004(2}. 
Because the evidence established that the .054 sample was an invalidly 
low test and did not reflect an accurate reading of Turbyfill's actual BAC, the 
district court did not err by denying her motion to dismiss the DUI charge against 
her. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Turbyfill's conviction for 
felony DUI. 
DATED this 10th day of May, 2012. 
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